111-How ‘Bout We Throttle This Golden Goose?

Now that GM has entered bankruptcy, there are many opinions crossing the wires about the likelihood of the new GM being a successful stand-alone company. I thought I might as well add to this crowd noise.

First of all, let’s consider the problems that caused the bankruptcy. The first, and least forgivable, cause was the management team. The management team, some years ago, gave away the store to the UAW. They promised wages, benefits and work rules that were non-competitive in the world market. They agreed to numerous, costly work rules, high wages, generous time off and extensive retiree benefits. Once they had made these concessions, management was afraid to face the prospect of a long strike that might have recaptured some of the company’s cost competitiveness. Effectively, labor costs became fixed.

The second source of the problem was the UAW or, more specifically, the leadership of the UAW. Once labor costs became fixed, they “owned” the golden goose called GM. They have watched for years as GM gradually ebbed away because of the high costs that the union contracts imposed on the company. They stuck to unbelievably ill-advised programs like the Jobs Bank, even while GM was hemorrhaging losses. Tell me. What did the leaderships of General Motors and the UAW study at school that led them to conclude that they could withstand an uncompetitive cost structure on the world stage? Who teaches that economics course?

Once management realized that it had put itself in an untenable cost position, it made changes to its products in order to reduce all the costs of the product, other than wages. (See Video #47: Rules for Cost Cutting in Hostility on StrategyStreet.com.) Among these changes, the company created look-alike cars across its various platforms. GM reduced the quality of its finished product so that the company developed a reputation among consumers for poor workmanship. This reputation caused the resale value of GM cars to fall below those of its international competitors and raised the cost of ownership for its customers. In another similar move, the company cheapened the interiors of its automobiles so that a customer sitting in a GM car found its quality of finish well below that of its competition. All of these changes, of course, were self-defeating cost reductions. This is a common phenomenon in tough markets. Common, but destructive. These changes caused GM to see its market share fall by about 1% a year for many years. The further the company’s market share fell, the more onerous was its labor cost structure with its high fixed costs.

So, O.K., the company has entered bankruptcy and most of its investors have suffered disastrous losses. Will GM emerge as a successful company? After all, the UAW has surrendered some of its high wages and some other rights, especially the right to strike for the next several years. And, the UAW is now a major owner of the new General Motors.

We have seen this movie before, however, with United Airlines. The labor unions, especially the pilots’ union, became major shareholders of United Airlines in trade for wage growth, as that company sought to restructure in order to reduce its cost structure. Union members in the airline industry, though, quickly figured out that a dollar of wages was worth a lot more to the union member than was a dollar of profits to all shareholders. High and uncompetitive wage demands continued, despite the fact that United Airlines was losing both market share and profits. Eventually, the pilots demanded, and won, such a high level of compensation that United Airlines slipped into bankruptcy. So much for the benefits of union ownership.

There is a simple test to determine whether GM will be successful as a stand-alone company. It is not a test of management capability or will. It is more a test of the insight that this saga of destruction has brought to the leadership of the UAW. The current contract between the UAW and General Motors is the size of a telephone book. If the company and its key union end up with a contract more the size of a college term paper, the odds of success are high. If the contract remains the size of a telephone book, we tax payers can plan to spend a whole lot more money on GM for a lot more years. It won’t succeed as a stand-alone company.

Posted 6/8/09

Update:

In 2022, GM is again a publicly-traded and profitable company. Unfortunately, it’s long-term outlook for competitive labor costs is not good. GM began contract negotiations with its union in 2019 with the hope that it might be able to cut labor costs in order to bring them closer to the costs of the US factories run today by foreign automakers. This hope vanished as the union went on strike, costing GM $2 billion. GM’s labor costs, and especially its health care costs, exceed those of its worldwide competitors. Over the long-term this is very bad news for the company’s future.

It appears in 2022 that the Japanese manufacturers continue to enjoy a cost and performance advantage over their American competitors. The Japanese continue to make a higher profit per auto produced. These companies are focused on Reliability and quality. Objective reports find Japanese cars to be better engineered, safer, longer lasting and less expensive to maintain. Hence, their higher profit per automobile sold.  The Japanese then use their higher profits to maintain their quality advantage over their competition. Over time, customers see GM as “failing” in their implied promises to customers. Some of these customers then gradually migrate to the Japanese competition, Increasing their share and consequent economies of scale.

GM faces an uphill battle because it’s paying a very high rate of cost for its major cost of people. It might improve its situation by concentrating on improving the productivity of each cost center in the company. HERE is a video describing the approach to improving that productivity.

8/22

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